The Fast Growth Constellation of the Second Kondratiev Wave in Britain
Some features of the second Kondratiev wave in Britain were essentially based on changes already introduced in the earlier phase of industrialization. For example, iron as a core input was already well established between 1780 and 1840 ( Figure  5 .1). What was new about the iron industry in the second Kondratiev wave was mainly the large-scale use of iron for railways and for new kinds of machinery.
The new industries and technologies that characterized the upswing of the second Kondratiev wave, and had already come together in an interdependent constellation in the 1820s and 1830s, were first and foremost these iron railways, both as infrastructure and as the fastest growing services for freight and for passengers from 1831 to the 1890s (Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3) . Intimately linked with the growth of railway services was of course the industry constructing steam locomotives and other rolling stock and railway equipment. The steam engines that powered the railway locomotives comprised a large fraction of the total output of steam engines. Many technical innovations in the design, power output, safety, and fuel consumption of steam engines were made following the use of Newcomen engines in British coal mines and of Watt engines in textiles and iron in the eighteenth century (Table 6. but in many sectors of industry and even in agriculture. The building of such steam engines was at the heart of a rapidly growing engineering industry, making machines and machine tools of all kinds on the basis of technologies developed in the 1820s and 1830s. The locomotives could only be built by the use of these new machine tools. Machines for making machines were essential for the mechanization of other industries. Finally, all of these sectors used the core inputs of coal and iron (Table 6 .2). Mathias summed up these interdependent advantages of what we are describing as the new constellation:
Steam power was pioneered through the demand for draining mines; the increasing demand for coal and iron ore was the greatest stimulus for applying steam power to transport. By 1850 the railways were the biggest single market for the iron industry (p.189) and through that for coal. It was exactly in this combination of accessible coal and iron ore-the strategic new materials-that Britain's natural resource position was ideal. It was exactly in the skills associated with the strategic new industries of iron and engineering that her lead over other countries was most marked. (Mathias 1969 (Mathias /1983 6.2 Railways 
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Source: G. R. Hawke (1970: 54) .
The role of railways as a new transport infrastructure is obvious and has been one of the main foci of analysis in the cliometrics debate (see especially Fogel 1964; G. R. Hawke 1970; and Chapter 1 above). However, their role as an exemplar for organizational and management innovation was no less important, although it has been relatively neglected in the cliometrics literature.
The railways conformed to most of the characteristics of a 'carrier branch' summarized in the Introduction to Part II. They gave an impetus to qualitative and structural change throughout the economic system. It is these aspects of the railway industry that have been most strongly emphasized by
Chandler (p.190) (1965, 1977, 1990) in the United States and by Mathias (1969 Mathias ( /1983 in Britain, and which we too will stress in the following sections.
The infrastructural developments have been amply documented in standard histories of the Industrial Revolution and the essential facts are clear. The main railway network was already constructed in Britain in the 1840s, following an initial burst of investment in the 1830s. Other countries, especially Germany and the United States, were also embarking on railway construction in the 1840s (Table 6. 3); but, taking geographical factors into account, the British lead was still substantial, and this was illustrated by the British role in railway investment, design, and construction in many parts of the world, as well as by the export of railway equipment and iron rails. The investment in British railways in the 1830s and 1840s was by far the largest ever undertaken, and the two waves of investment in 1834-7 and 1844-7 (p.191)
have generally been described, both at the time and since, as outbursts of 'railway mania' comparable to, but much larger than, the canal mania of the 1790s. A feature of the railway mania, as of the earlier canal mania or the contemporary Internet bubble, was the exaggerated expectation of the profits to be made. The actual profits were indeed quite high in some of the early railways (e.g. the LiverpoolManchester Railway) and this, together with the euphoria of press speculation, was sufficient to induce the type of 'bandwagon' effects analysed by Schumpeter. The rush to build railways all over the country without much regard for the national network and involving much duplication meant inevitably that many lines and companies would turn out to be unprofitable in the end, or even quite early on, while many projected lines were never actually built. As Mathias pointed out, in this respect the British railways were similar to the earlier canals and turnpike roads: 
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Source: G. R. Hawke (1970: 58) The economic potential of these transport media was therefore never fully realized. The turnpikes were piecemeal with many gaps and their management bedevilled by corruption . . . the canals came into existence without a national strategy, with different (p. 192) The supersession of one transport or energy infrastructure by another can by its nature never be an overnight event (Grübler 1990) . What happens, rather, is that the limitations of one network become increasingly apparent and the demand for new facilities accumulates until the feasibility of an alternative and/or additional network becomes apparent. The LiverpoolManchester Railway was the event that fired the public imagination and the entrepreneurial spirit on the necessary scale for new investment. In the 1820s, Huskisson promoted the Liverpool-Manchester Railway Bill through Parliament on the grounds that the canals held the merchants and manufacturers to ransom and that cotton took longer to get from Liverpool to Manchester than from New Orleans to
Liverpool. Canal tolls were cut from 15/-per ton to 10/-per ton as soon as the railway opened in 1830 (Mathias 1969 (Mathias /1983 . Higher speed, greater regularity, and greater reliability were among the major advantages of railways for much commerce, while canals and roads were affected adversely by frost and other hazards of the weather.
The advantages for passenger traffic were even greater, and the big surprise of the 1830s and 1840s was that passenger traffic initially grew faster than freight. Fares were much lower than by mail-coach and 400,000 people travelled on the Liverpool-Manchester line in its first year of operation. It was not only the comfort of travellers and the big saving in fares that led to this change, but also the needs of commerce.
Wedgwood had already introduced a code of practice for his travelling salesmen in the eighteenth century, and by the 1830s many industries depended on the efforts and speed of their commercial travellers and executives. These competitive pressures and requirements of business are omitted from the calculations of cliometrics but were of great economic and social significance, just as airlines are today. Of course, as has often been shown, the early railways were far from being an 'optimal' investment and suffered from many shortcomings. Moreover, the number of horses in use on British roads in the nineteenth century continued to increase since they were needed more than ever for the journeys beyond the railway stations. Canals continued to be more convenient for some freight transport because of the failure of the new rail networks to connect some important transport nodes. Only much later were other serious deficiencies of the early British railway investment to be fully revealed, such as the selection of a narrow gauge for most railways instead of Brunel's broad gauge. As Landes (1969) pointed out, this also affected the efficiency of industries such as iron and steel because of the small capacity of the freight-wagons compared with the German or American railways. Mathias (1969 Mathias ( /1983 dismisses such calculations out of hand, arguing that it is 'impossible to quantify the total gains which railways brought to the British economy' and that 'the importance of the coming of the railways as a service for the economy as a whole lies in the fact that they enabled economic activity in all other sectors of the economy to expand'. This standpoint is fully consistent with our notion of a carrier branch at the heart of a constellation of fast-growing industries and a 'veritable incarnation of a technological revolution'.
The extraordinarily strong impact of the railways on the social and economic development of the country is apparent not only from economic statistics, but also from art and literature. Not only did the railways carry almost the whole of the increase in transport services all over Europe for this long period, but transport services as a whole were rapidly increasing as a share of GDP. O'Brien estimates that this share more than doubled between 1840 and 1913 and attributes this to the high passenger income elasticity of demand, together with the fact that both internal and foreign trade increased more rapidly than output of goods.
All the beneficial effects of widening markets identified by Adam Smith for scale economies and specialization were realized more rapidly with railways than with the earlier canal O'Brien points not only to these direct benefits to all sectors of the economy from the construction of railway networks, but also to many of the indirect benefits, often omitted from the calculations made by cliometricians, but crucial for our analysis. For example, he highlights the role of the railways (and also of the canals at one time) in training many kinds of labour-engineers, foremen, and managers 'whose skills (initially acquired in transportation) contributed to the development of other industries '. Chandler (1965; Chandler and Hikino 1977) takes this point much further, arguing that the American railways provided the first example for the whole of the American business community of how to manage and run very large organizations, with attention to long-term costing, maintenance, and depreciation, as well as to the recruitment, training, and deployment of personnel. The railways were also important in establishing workshops for the repair, maintenance, and manufacture of components and equipment (Usselman 1999; Atack 1999) . These were often the equivalent of quite large engineering firms and in some ways amounted to an internalized R&D department, even though they did not bear that name and research was not their main activity. As we shall see in Chapter 7, Andrew Carnegie, the most successful entrepreneur in the American steel industry in the third Kondratiev wave, attributed his success to the experience he had in management as a young man working on the American railways.
The first great British railway promoter-George Hudsonwho epitomized 'the very archetype of the vulgar swaggering adventurer bred world-wide by the railways' (Faith 1990)-set out to build an enormous empire based on numerous amalgamations, and on fraudulent transactions in land, railways, docks, and finance. He was the focus of great attention from the media at the time of the 1840s railway boom and survived the crash of 1847 only to fall two years later. Although he controlled nearly a third of the 5,000 miles of British railways, he did not control some of the key lines and his fraud was ultimately discovered and exposed. (p.197) The huge scale and intensity of the railway mania of 1844-5 has been well described by P. J. G. Ransom:
The bubble of financial speculation that was called the Railway mania was inflating wildly. It was much helped by the activities of men such as George Hudson . . . For a railway company promoter, a judiciously spread rumour that Hudson 'The Railway King' was interested could send the price of shares soaring. Railway promotion, originally a matter for routes where the need was evident and the engineering practicable, had spread first to routes where demand was doubtful and the engineering full of problems . . . But then promotion had spread still further. . . . With the public clamouring for railway shares, companies now were being formed solely so that promoters might in due course unload their shares at a premium, leaving others to hold their unlikely babies. (Ransom 1990: 86) It was this type of promotion that led to the low esteem of the public for railway entrepreneurs and promoters and to the special role of railway shares in Lewis Carroll's poem 'The Hunting of the Snark'. However, the genuine railways, as they came into existence, were certainly popular, and it was the railway engineers and engineer-entrepreneurs who were national heroes. Men like Brunel and Stephenson embodied the spirit of creative enterprise to a far greater extent than promoters like Hudson. Stephenson's funeral in 1848 was attended by over 100,000 people, a tribute to an engineer never witnessed before or since in Britain. Thus, the contribution of the railways to a new model of large-scale business activity, although tarnished by promoters like Hudson, was by no means extinguished. Employment on the railways was much sought after and, for the time, relatively well rewarded. They were the model of progressive business.
Despite its excesses, the mania for railway shares led in the end to the construction of a national network, which in 1846-8 accounted for about half of total investment in Britain and a labour force of 250,000 people working on construction. This was of course at the peak of the boom, but the numbers in regular employment on the railway system itself continued to grow fast. Mathias (1969 Mathias ( /1983 estimated investment in fixed capital in railways in the 1860s boom as a quarter of the total and still over 10 per cent in the 1870s. Railway
The Second Kondratiev Wave: The Age of Iron Railways, Steam Power, and Mechanization (Table 6 .2), especially for freight, but are nevertheless very impressive. Among the characteristics of an efficient business enterprise that were fostered and diffused by the railways, and which today we take for granted, were such elementary practices as a high level of punctuality, forward planning of services, regular maintenance, control of competent specialists for subcontracting, and speed of delivery for both goods and travellers. The railways also developed methods, which were so important for the large-scale enterprises of the late nineteenth century, of controlling operations at many different locations from a single centre. All of these were facilitated by another major (p.198) technical and organizational innovation-the electric telegraph, invented by Wheatstone, a professor at King's College London in 1837 and diffused extremely rapidly alongside the new railway tracks in the 1840s. Numerous other innovations, in signalling equipment, in rolling stock, and in civil engineering for tunnels and embankments, were made by or for the railway companies and their numerous suppliers all over the country. With what E. P. Thompson called the 'enormous condescension of posterity', it is easy to overlook these achievements, often now so obvious that they are hardly noticed.
O'Brien notes other indirect effects of railway investment:
Accelerated rates of capital formation which took place in transport sectors throughout Europe in the nineteenth century also gave rise to a range of externalities, or spinoffs, which are not captured either in the declining real prices of transport services, or changes in the structure of relative prices. For example . . . canals and later railways made voracious demands for capital over relatively short periods of time which prompted the expansion and improvement of financial intermediaries for the mobilization of domestic and foreign savings. The more direct backward linkages of the railways to the coal, iron, and engineering industries are more easily assessed and are reviewed in the following subsections. Again, the qualitative changes in the ways of organizing production were more important than the simple quantities of coal or iron transported or consumed by the railways. It was the railways that made it possible to diffuse a new technological style based on coal, iron, and the steam engine throughout the Victorian economy. They may deservedly be viewed in every sense as the 'carrier branch' of the second Kondratiev. This applies a fortiori to the American railways, which will be discussed in Section 6.6. Some accounts of railway development stress that the steam locomotives of the railway boom themselves consumed only a relatively small proportion of total coal consumption-probably less than 2 per cent. However, this way of looking at the 'backward linkage' ignores two main features of the link between coal and railways. First, it neglects the demonstration effect-the fact that all over the country people could see the power of the steam engine fuelled by coal in a spectacular form. Second, and even more importantly, the railways made coal universally available to all kinds of other users and at a lower price than hitherto. In fact, as we shall see, steam locomotives and iron rails were developed between 1800 and 1830 mainly to haul coal.
Coal was not one of those inputs with a steeply falling price based on technical innovations. Steam engines were used in the mines for pumping from early in the eighteenth century (Newcomen engines) and, although (p.199) coal mining remained one of the major markets for steam engines, technical change in coal mining itself was relatively slow. The price of coal did fall in many areas in the early nineteenth century, but this was due far more to improvements in transport, including the railways, than to innovations in mining (Table 6 .4). Geological conditions imposed a constant tendency for costs to increase in many coalfields.
The case of iron was very different. As already shown in Chaper 5 ( Figure 5 .2), the price of iron fell substantially both during and after the Napoleonic Wars as a result primarily of technical innovations (coke smelting and Cort's puddling and rolling process). Both of these innovations depended on the availability of plentiful coal supplies. The reduction in transport costs certainly benefited iron production and facilitated the continuing fall in the price of iron, especially of heavy duty wrought iron for the manufacture of iron rails, first demonstrated in 1821 by Birkinshaw (Tylecote 1992). The use of better steam engines for blowing in blast furnaces, and for steam hammers in forges, also contributed to the falling cost of iron products.
Whereas for coal the direct consumption by the railways was less than 2 per cent of total output, for the iron industry it was a far higher proportion-about a quarter of domestic sales in 1840 and nearly half of total consumption at the peak of the railway construction boom in 1848. After 1850, the share of railway consumption in domestic sales of iron fell to about 10 per cent or just over. But this was largely offset by a big rise in railway exports. These were separately measured only from 1856, but the combined home and export sales of iron to railways accounted for over 20 per cent of total sales from 1856 to 1870. These exports were not included in G. R. Hawke's (1970) estimate of 'social savings' (Riden 1980). After 1870, steel rails became a core input for the third Kondratiev, and, as will be shown in Chapter 7, the falling price and universal availability of steel was a major feature of that new constellation of fast-growing industries.
What the railways did was to make coal and iron (and later steel) available as cheap inputs in all the industrializing areas of Britain, and only a little Cotton retained its extraordinary lead in British exports right down to the 1920s (Table 6 .5 and Figure 6 .5), but between 1830 and 1860 the share of iron increased while that of cotton was falling. Exports of machinery and of coal also grew rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth century, but their importance for the domestic economy was far greater. While coal could be regarded as a second 'core input' after iron, the engineering industry, to which we now turn, was in some respects another carrier branch of the second Kondratiev wave, together with the railways.
Steam Engines, Machine Tools, and the Engineering Industry
In assessing the contribution of the steam engine to the Industrial Revolution, David Landes wrote: 'The development of mechanized industry concentrated in large units of production would have been impossible without a source of power greater than what human and animal strength could provide and independent of the vagaries of nature . . . Coal and steam did not make the Industrial Revolution, but they permitted its extraordinary development and diffusion' (Landes 1969: 41).
The relatively slow diffusion of the steam engine, including the Watt engine, in the early period of the first Kondratiev wave appears to have been due mainly both to the technical limitations and to the high costs of these engines. The Watt patents, which were extended by Parliament for a very long period, also constrained inventive and innovative activity, so that at the turn of the century the number of applications was still relatively small. It was between 1800 and 1850 that the major technical advances were made which reduced the cost and improved the performance of the steam engine to the point where it could be very widely applied both for transport and for stationary engines. It was the sequence of innovations in the machine tool industry in this period, but especially between 1800 and 1830, that made it possible to construct high pressure engines which were both safer and far more efficient. The reduction in coal consumption (in pounds of coal per hour per HP) is shown in Tostrup identified himself with the old production system, or with the privileged group of sawmill owners. We must understand his motives as a businessman within this social (p.203) and cultural framework. Within the system he pursued the maximization of profit in competition with the other mills. However, when faced with a more fundamental threat against the system which gave him his success, he put aside the consideration of profit maximization and replaced it with the aim of preserving the system. In short, this is a beautiful example of how rationality somehow has to be bounded. (Sejerstedt 1998: 238) Furthermore, the deregulation, when it came, was pushed through by the Norwegian state against the opposition of the owners in the name of modernization and technical progress.
Problems of regulation were also involved when it came to the construction of railways in Britain, since each new railway required a special parliamentary bill. This procedure was attended by an enormous amount of lobbying by landowners and other special interests. Parliament had passed 23 bills authorizing public railways before the Stockton-Darlington railway was promoted in 1823. Most of these were short horse tramways with a length of 15 miles or less, and almost all were to haul coal. Half a dozen engineers were striving to adapt the steam engine to haul locomotives, and it was George
Stephenson who was the most successful of these. 'By throwing the exhaust steam up the boiler-fire chimney the Table 1 in the Introduction to Part II).
It had become possible to design and make far better steam engines, not because later engineers were more brilliant than James Watt, but in large part because of advances in machine tool technology and in the precision of engineering. In particular, the boring of cylinders to precise dimensions was essential for the high-pressure engines that powered locomotives. As already described in Section 5.3 above, John Wilkinson's boring machine, patented in 1775, played a crucial role in the improvement of the performance of the Boulton and Watt steam engine. Wilkinson's machine was only the first of a whole series of machine tool innovations which were already the object of design and development work by engineers in the late eighteenth century, but it was the establishment of a specialized machine tool industry led by Henry Maudslay (1771-1831) that was decisive for making high-performance machines powered by steam generally available. Between 1800 and 1830, Maudslay's factory became a Mecca for most of the best engineers in the country, including Roberts, Nasmyth, and Whitworth, each of whom was responsible for major innovations.
Iron firms often went into the manufacture of boilers, engines, and machines, and according to Musson (1980) , this close association continued right down to 1870. However, as Musson points out, it was the emergence of specialist machine tool firms that led to the widespread diffusion of the 'machines to make machines'. It was this technology that Paulinyi (1989) has described as the 'Alpha and Omega' of the Industrial Revolution. Maudslay pioneered vital measurement instruments and techniques essential for high-precision work, including gauges, true-planes, and screw-making tackle, and in the 1820s, Roberts was already selling standard gearwheels and screws together with machine tools from his Manchester factory. He 'developed standardized production of mules and looms using templates and gauges, and later applied the same technique to locomotive manufacture' (Musson 1980: 91) .
N. Rosenberg (1963) is justly well known for his account of specialization in the American machine tool industry and its crucial role in American industrialization. However, Musson claims that it was in fact the British machine tool industry that pioneered 'mass production', and that Rosenberg was mistaken in attributing priority to the 'American system of manufactures' for small arms production. Most famous of all was Whitworth, with his machine tools and precision engineering, the supreme practitioner and propagandist of standard measurements, gauges and screwthreads, mass production and interchangeability, from the late 1830s right on throughout the third quarter of the century. By the late 1850s he was able to claim, and it was generally recognized, that these methods had been widely, indeed almost universally, adopted in heavy engineering. (Musson 1980: 92) (p.205) Musson maintains that the American pre-eminence was in light engineering, whereas the British lead was clearcut in interchangeable parts and mass production for heavy engineering, going right back to block-making for the Navy. Maudslay constructed all the block-making machines designed by Brunel for the Admiralty plant in Portsmouth between 1802 and 1809. In 1810 this plant was making 100,000 blocks per annum and was the first large-scale plant employing machine tools for mass production. With these machines, ten unskilled men could do the work of 110 skilled block-workers. Apart from two large sawing machines, all the others were of metal and precise in operation to allow the assembly of component parts (Corry 1990) .
Thus, by 1820 the development of true-planing of metal surfaces and of slotting and shaping machines had already eliminated much costly filing, chiselling, and hand grinding. In Musson's view the British development of 'mass production' was not 'precocious', but simply reflected the fact that 'mechanical engineering, particularly the development of machine tools, originated earlier and spread more extensively in Britain than in the USA, during the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century. This is indeed what one would expect, since the Industrial Revolution occurred first in Britain' (Musson 1980: 91) . Chapter 8 will review the concept of Fordist mass production and discuss this in relation to such earlier systems as the British engineering industry and what is often known as 'the American system of production'.
By 1870 the official statistics (Returns of Factory Employment) showed that 167,000 people were engaged in the 'manufacture of machinery'. They were employed in 2,000 factories with steam engines deploying 42,000 horsepower. Both the railways and the cotton industry employed more people than this, but the role of the machine-building industry in providing engines and machinery for mechanizing these and other sectors gave it a unique importance.
Steam Ships, Iron Ships, and Shipping
In the 1830s and 1840s, the British ship-building industry had lost out in competition with American shipyards, which were designing and building longer and deeper sailing ships. According to Mathias (1969 Mathias ( /1983 American ships had smaller crews, but sailed faster and carried more cargo. He estimates that British ships were twenty years behind American ones in design in this period, and American ships carried three-quarters of the Anglo-American trade.
It was the iron steamship that restored the British competitive position and made ship-building and shipping two of the most successful British industries in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Brunel was not only a great railway engineer and bridge builder: he also designed some of the first steamships, including the Great Western (1837) However, it had taken a fairly long time for the steamship to defeat competition from the sailing ship, which also began to use iron hulls. The competitive innovations in sailing ships are sometimes described to this day as the 'sailing ship effect', to indicate this possibility in technological competition for a threatened industry. It was actually only in the 1870s that the steam tonnage exceeded the sailing ship tonnage launched from British yards (Figure 6 .4). The basic innovations in iron steamships were British and were ultimately successful in driving the sailing ship out of world competition for all heavy In the first half of the nineteenth century, despite a rich endowment of natural resources and many favourable institutions, growth in the United States was still retarded by the lack of an appropriate transport infrastructure to take advantage of the natural endowment and size of the country and its market. The advent of railways and the new technologies of the late nineteenth century enabled it to forge far ahead of the rest of the world. At first, the United States imported much of this technology, as well as much capital and labour, from Europe, but from the very beginning American inventors modified and reshaped these technologies to suit American circumstances. By the end of the century, American engineers and scientists were developing new processes and products in most industries that were more productive than those in Britain.
As argued in Chapter 5, among those institutions most favourable to economic growth in eighteenth-century Britain were the scientific spirit, which was influential in the national culture, and the support for technical invention. These features were readily transferred to the United States, and respect for science and technology has been an enduring feature of American society from Benjamin Franklin onwards.
As de Tocqueville observed in his classic on Democracy in America (1836: 315), 'In America the purely practical part of science is admirably understood and careful attention is paid to the theoretical position which is immediately requisite to application. On this head the Americans always display a free, original and inventive power of mind.'
The relative abundance of land, the westward moving frontier, the destruction of the native civilizations or their confinement to a relatively Source: Abramovitz and David (1994: 9) .
(p.209) small part of the territory-all favoured a purely capitalist form of economic development. The big exception to these generalizations was of course the slave economy of the South.
It is difficult to assess the degree to which the economic growth of the South in particular and of the Union in general was retarded by the prevalence of this slave economy, 2 but it was in the period that followed the victory of the North in the Civil War that the United States achieved rates of growth well above any previously achieved by Britain. Even after its abolition, slavery left an enduring legacy of social and economic problems, some of which persist to this day, but the maintenance of the Union meant that the predominantly modern capitalist path of development in the North and West prevailed throughout the country. In these circumstances, an entrepreneurial culture could flourish as nowhere else. The United States overtook Britain and all other industrial countries in share of world manufacturing output between 1860 and 1900 (Table 5 .7).
In their analysis of the sources of economic growth, Abramovitz and David argue that the higher relative price of labour in North America induced substitution of capital and natural resource inputs for skilled labour. This stimulated, as early as the first half of the nineteenth century, the development of a specific American labour-saving, capitalintensive technological trajectory of mechanization and standardized production. As the nineteenth century advanced, 'the engineering techniques of large-scale production and high throughput rates became more fully explored and more widely diffused. American managers became experienced in the organization, finance and operation of large enterprises geared to creating and exploiting mass markets' (Abramowitz and David 1994: 10).
The extent to which this specific American trajectory of capital-intensive technology diverged from that of Europe (and Japan) can be clearly seen from Table 6 .8. Until the 1880s, Great Britain still had an overall capital-labour ratio higher than that of the United States, but by 1938, like all other countries, the ratio had fallen to less than half of the US ratio. extraordinary productivity gains in mining and mineral processing are emphasized in particular by Abramovitz and David (1994) . Gavin Wright (1999) has shown that the education and professional standards of mining engineers and other engineers were one of the main factors in sustaining the high rate of technical change in these industries. metals, oil, and chemicals. Steel, copper, and electricity are the main focus of the account that follows in Chapter 7, because they were the key elements in the new constellation of fast-growing industries and technologies at the heart of the third Kondratiev wave.
Whereas in the early period of railway construction Britain was the source of much of the capital invested in the American railways and of the iron rails themselves, as well as most of the major inventions, as the American railway network expanded the role of American capital, entrepreneurship, innovations, and equipment became predominant. Cornelius Vanderbilt was rather more successful than George Hudson had been in Britain as a railway magnate. Before his death in 1877 he amassed a fortune of over $100 million from his operations in shipping and railways, which he passed on to his son, William Henry Vanderbilt, who doubled this fortune from railways, leading the fight against government regulation. Alfred Chandler's (1965) study of The Railroads: The Nation's First Big Business shows how important their development was for American management methods, and Chapter 7 illustrates this point with the example of Andrew Carnegie, the leading entrepreneur in the steel industry. The huge scale of American railway construction and traffic provided opportunities for many other industries supplying rails, engineering products, brass, felt, timber, and components throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. About 2,000 miles of track were added each year on average to the US rail network in the 1850s and the 1860s, despite the Civil War, and this rose to over 5,000 miles of new track each year in the early 1870s. This huge expansion of track mileage continued right up to the First World War, albeit at a slower rate. Chandler (1965: 22) estimates that by the 1860s the railways were using half the iron rolled in the United States and, by 1880, three-quarters of all the steel produced there.
The complementarities between the growth of railways and the coal and iron industries were even greater in the United States than they had been in Britain because of the huge trans-continental scale of American railway construction and operation. Nor did Germany, France, and Belgium differ very substantially (p.211) with respect to the role of railways, coal, and iron in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. This constellation was characteristic of all those industrializing countries that made substantial progress with 'catch-up' in the nineteenth century. In Belgium in particular, these three industries dominated economic development and the complementarities between the three were extremely close (Boschma 1999).
While Fogel (1964) has contested the views of Chandler and other historians on the importance of the railways in the growth of the American economy, he nevertheless admits that 'the idea of a crucial nexus between the railroad and the forward surge of the American economy following 1840 appears to be supported by an avalanche of factual evidence' (Fogel 1962: 164) . He cites Savage's comment in his Economic History of Transport (Savage 1959) that the 'influence of the railroad can hardly be over-estimated ', and Rostow's (1960) view that the 'railroad was historically the most powerful single initiator of take-offs' and that it led to the rapid development of the coal, iron, and engineering industries. In disputing these widely held views, Fogel argues that association does not prove causality and that his 'social savings' technique demonstrates the possibility of a 'counterfactual' account based on the continued predominance of canals and water transport. While it is true that canals, lakes, and rivers continued to be more important in the United States than in most European countries throughout the nineteenth century, it is hardly possible to deny that railways, together with the telegraph, brought great competitive advantages to many sectors of American industry and agriculture, notably in speed and reliability of transport and communication.
Chandler also stresses the complementarities between the railway and the telegraph in spreading simultaneously across the Continent and permitting control of rail operations within the network as well as huge externalities to third party users. He summarizes the combined effects of the railroad, the steamship, and the telegraph:
[They] made transportation and communication faster, cheaper and more certain than it had ever been before. The telegraph provided almost instantaneous communication to nearly every part of the nation, while the railroad and steamship permitted a fast and regular movement of mail. . . Of still more significance was the impact these new firms had on the movement of goods and passengers. Speed and volume increased immediately. The rail-road reduced the time required for a trip from New York to Chicago from more than three weeks to less than three days. In the winter when the canals and rivers were frozen, the passage west by stage coach had taken even longer. For freight the shipping time had been greater than for passengers, and in the winter months only the lightest and most valuable types of freight could be moved at all. (Chandler 1965: 7) It was the new regularity and volume of transportation and the greater certainty and accuracy of communication that made possible the growth of the factory system of production throughout the United States as well as the huge growth of wholesale and retail business in the cities. Fogel failed to take fully into account the critical importance of railways for the stocks of (p.212) materials and components in industry and commerce and the reduction in costs of circulating capital.
Finally, Chandler argues that the most significant contribution of the railroads to the growth of the American (and indirectly the world) economy was in the sphere of institutional change, i.e. new patterns of finance, labour relations, management, competition, and government regulation: 'Railroad promoters and managers pioneered in all these areas not because they were a particularly intelligent or perceptive breed of entrepreneurs but because they had to. Their capitalization, their plant and equipment, their running expenses and labor force were much larger than those of any other business of that day ' (Chandler 1965: 9 When in 1885 the United States produced and put on to the market seventy-four thousand tons as against forty thousand tons in 1882, the world's prices of copper greatly declined. A large number of the smaller producers were compelled to suspend operations or were entirely crushed; but the great Spanish and other important mines endeavoured 'to offset the diminution of profit on the unit of quantity' by increasing their production and thus the price of copper continued to decline until it reached a lower figure than ever before known in history. (D. A. Wells 1890: 74) Wells concludes from the example of copper and other evidence that 'under such circumstances industrial overproductionmanifesting itself in excessive competition to effect sales and a reduction of prices below the cost of production-may become chronic and there appears to be no other means of avoiding such results than that the great producers should come to some understanding among themselves as to the prices they will ask; which in turn naturally implies arguments as to the extent which they will produce . . . ' (p. 74) The copper industry was only one of a constellation of new industries experiencing rapid growth and technical change. So impressive were these changes that many observers, both at the time and since (e.g. Chandler), described them as a 'Second Industrial Revolution'.
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Wells attributes the general instability, 'economic disturbances', and prevalence of unemployment in the 1880s to a combination of the achievements of a previous wave of technical change (railways, mechanization, steamships, etc.) and the rise of the new technologies and industries affecting the world economy-Bessemer steel, oil, electricity, copper smelting, and so forth. He argues that 'all investigators substantially agree that the depression of industry in recent years has been experienced with the greatest severity in those countries where machinery has been most extensively adopted' (D. A. Wells 1890: 68).
We have argued in the Introduction to Part II and in Chapter 5 that each crisis of structural adjustment in the economy is based on the conjuncture of the rapid rise from small beginnings of a constellation of new products, processes, and services and the slowing down of the impetus from a previous wave of (p.214) technical change. In the period from the 1840s to the 1870s, both the United States and many European countries had experienced a boom based on railways, iron, steam power and mechanization. In the case of the United States, this was of course disrupted by the Civil War of 1861-5, but Wells was able to observe the exceptionally large productivity gains coming through in the postwar period, based on the huge improvements in the transport infrastructure and the technical changes introduced in many industries by capital-intensive mechanization. At the same time, he could see the employment displacing effects of this mechanization before the employment-creation effects of the new constellation had achieved a sufficient magnitude. The situation was analagous to the British crisis of structural adjustment in the 1830s and 1840s.
The new wave of technical advance and structural change from the 1870s onwards was driven not only by a new constellation of inventions and innovations but also by the declining profitability, intensified competition, and diminishing opportunities for new profitable investment in the now mature older industrial sectors, as can be clearly seen from the example of the railway industry itself, both in the United States and in Britain. Chandler comments on this change:
The change in the railroad world from expansion to competition in the 1870s affected nearly all the ways of doing business. Intensified competition brought the associations and consolidations that in turn led to the demand for government regulation. The rise of the great consolidated systems raised new problems of finance and increased the role of the investment banking house in American railroading. The management of the huge new systems became immensely more complex. Finally, depression, competition, and the resulting reduction in pay and lay-offs of personnel helped to transform the railroad brotherhoods from fraternal and mutual-aid societies into instruments of economic power. Their members began to use the union to improve their wages, hours and conditions of work through collective bargaining supported by the threat of a strike. (Chandler 1965: 15) The The first industrial revolution was the work of very small firms. In Adam Smith's day hardly any firms employed more than a hundred people, and even by the 1840s only a very few firms, mainly in the cotton and iron industries, employed over a thousand. During the next few decades this number steadily increased, including, of course, some large railway companies and engineering firms. In other European countries too, the more successful firms were growing rapidly in size and market power. The railways and the telegraph were for the (p.216) most part publicly owned as they were widely believed to be essential for strategic commercial as well as military reasons. Friedrich List is well-known in Britain and America as an advocate of protection for 'infant industries', which indeed he was. However, he was often better known in Germany as an advocate of a national railway network, which was an essential infrastructure for industrialization and for a customs union (Zollverein) of the various German states. The achievement of both these objectives enabled German firms greatly to expand their markets and their scale of operations. The firm of Krupp, for example, which employed only just over 100 employees in 1848, already employed over 1,000 by 1857 and 8,000 by 1865; by 1873 this had doubled to 16,000, which was of course largely due to the exceptional advertisement for Krupp armaments in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 (Menne 1937). However, other German, French, Italian, and British firms were also growing rapidly and numbering their employees in the thousands rather than the hundreds by the 1870s and 1880s. Even at the more typical level of several hundred employees, the entrepreneurs of the mid-nineteenth century found increasing difficulties in the management of their enterprises. Few could behave as Josiah Wedgwood did in the eighteenth century and look after all aspects of their business. The solution most commonly adopted, which evolved naturally from the increasing variety of machines and skills, was to devolve responsibility to the skilled craftworkers or foremen, who would be given responsibility, often in the form of a subcontract, for a whole group of workers and machines. So far did this devolution go in some English firms that the skilled workers identified with management to a considerable extent and it was not unknown for some to arrive at work wearing top hats. Although this solution worked fairly well in many industries for many decades, it came under increasing strain towards the end of the century. Its success over a long period in the cotton industry has been very well described by Mass and Lazonick (1990) . They attribute the prolonged commercial success of the British cotton industry over a long period in the nineteenth century largely to the accumulation of specialized skills, the cooperative attitude of the skilled craft unions, and the devolution of responsibility to the skilled workers. However, in common with other historians, Lazonick (1990) also points to the decline of this shopfloor management system in Britain and the rise of the American professional managerial bureaucracy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This change in the American managerial organization and the parallel changes in Germany are described in some detail in Chapter 7.
The craft-and shopfloor-based management system came under pressure both from structural change and from technical change. The newer industries, such as electrical equipment, oil, and chemicals, needed a hierarchy of professionally qualified managers as well as skilled craftworkers. Taylorist management philosophers and consultants favoured the shift of power away from the shopfloor to the office and laboratory. At the same time, the unskilled and semi-skilled workers who were left out of the sometimes cosy relationship between (p.217) managers and craft unions began increasingly to assert themselves in the years of the depression in the 1880s and 1890s. There had been sporadic attempts to organize 'general' unions and industrial unions before, but these became more persistent and successful in the late nineteenth century. The 'new unionism' was not only often overtly hostile to capitalism as such, but was also less than friendly to the old craft unions whose members it also sometimes sought to enrol. Hobsbawm argued that it was the depression of the 1870s and 1880s that undermined free trade and greatly strengthened protectionist pressures from both industry and agriculture:
'The trend towards freer trade was reversed in Russia in 1874-5, in Spain in 1877, in Germany in 1879 and practically everywhere else except Britain-and even here free trade was under pressure from the 1880s.' (p. 356)
As we have seen, the growth of industrial production was both more broadly based and more rapid in the second Kondratiev wave than in the first. The boom that followed the 1848 revolutions and the sharp recession of 1847-8 was remarkable in several ways. British exports expanded more rapidly than ever before, and so too did the exports of several other European countries. The Great International Exhibition organized in the new 'Crystal Palace' in London in 1851 was a massive and triumphant display of self-confident industrial and technological progress. Numerous industries showed off their latest designs, but perhaps none was more impressive or symbolic than the largest piece of coal ever displayed. The Crystal Palace Exhibition was visited by over 6 million people between May and October, with an average attendance of about 43,000 per day. In Turgenev's novel Smoke (1867 Smoke ( :1914 , he describes the impression made on a Russian visitor by the Crystal Palace; he was depressed by the fact that Russian inventions played no part in 'a sort of exhibition of everything that has been devised by the ingenuity of man' (p. 154). The Philadelphia Exhibition in 1876 attracted even more visitorsover 10 million. Similar exhibitions in several major (p.218) European cities played a very important role in stimulating public awareness of the vast range of new products becoming available on world markets and promoting world-wide business contacts. The huge expansion of production and exports was facilitated by the new transport infrastructure of shipping and railways and by the victory of international free trade. The institutional and social framework all over the industrializing countries was changing to adapt to the free market, not only in matters of trade but in many other respects too, as in company legislation and labour market legislation.
According to data presented by Hobsbawm (1975: 55) , total world steam power rose from 4 million HP in 1850 to 18.5 million in 1870, world iron output quadrupled, and world industrial production more than doubled. A calculation made in 1880 showed that world tonnage of steamships increased from 264,000 tons in 1851 to nearly 2 million tons in 1871. Not surprisingly, these prodigious increases induced a sense of euphoria, especially in Germany after the Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, the unification of the Reich under the Prussian Emperor, and the founding of numerous new companies. 'Never was economic euphoria among businessmen higher than in the early 1870s' (Hobsbawm 1975: 62) .
Although the trade cycle was by then a well recognized phenomenon and had been thoroughly analysed in the 1850s by the French doctor Clement Juglar, whose name was given to it, the severity of the 1870s depression nevertheless came as a shock. German share prices fell by 60 per cent between peak and trough and the iron industry suffered a drastic cut in output with many blast furnaces shutting down. Commodity prices fell continuously through the 1870s and 1880s. Several German commentators emphasized the persistence of crisis phenomena, as did David Wells (1890) in the United States. The structural crisis of adjustment was felt as a period of depression, even though aggregate production was rising.
It was also a period when the discontent of the growing class of industrial workers found increasingly radical expression. The Paris Commune of 1871 was a unique explosion but it caused great alarm and stimulated socialist movements all over Europe. 
